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Abstract:  Using a regional VAR, we find large differences in the effects of monetary policy 
shocks across regions of the United States.  We also find that the region-level effects of 
monetary policy differ a great deal between the pre-Volcker and Volcker-Greenspan periods in 
terms of their depth and length.  The two sample periods also yield very different rankings of the 
regions in terms of the effects of monetary policy.  We find that regional difference in the depths 
of recession are related to the banking concentration, whereas differences in the total cost of 
recession are related to industry mix.  Finally, we demonstrate that the differences between the 
two sample periods are due to changes in the mechanism by which monetary policy shocks are 
propagated.  (JEL: E52, R12) 
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  The United States has one currency and, correspondingly, one monetary policy for all of 
its states and regions.  The Federal Reserve takes little account of spatial business cycle patterns 
when it makes monetary policy decisions, despite large differences in regional business cycle 
fluctuations.
1  Although the Fed collects information at the regional level, this is used primarily 
to measure aggregate economic conditions, with little regard for the regional distribution of 
conditions that underlie the aggregate.
2  Presumably, the Fed holds the view that monetary 
policy cannot and should not be used to affect particular regions or states.
3  While not 
disagreeing with this view, we demonstrates how an understanding of the regional effects of 
monetary policy can help policymakers to understand how the aggregate economy responds to 
monetary shocks.   
  This paper continues a line of recent research that uses current tools of monetary-policy 
analysis to estimate the regional effects of monetary policy, a question prominent in the regional 
science literature in the 1970s and 1980s.
4  Carlino and DeFina (1998, 1999) and Fratantoni and 
Schuh (2003) estimate region-, state-, and MSA-level effects of monetary policy shocks using 
vector autoregressions (VARs), the now-standard empirical tool among monetary economists.  
Carlino and DeFina estimate the impact of permanent changes in the federal funds rate, finding 
                                                 
1 Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2004), for example, show that there are significant differences in the timing of 
recessions and expansions across states and regions. 
2 Note, though, that Meade and Sheets (2002) find that the probability of an FOMC member dissenting from the 
majority is higher the more conditions in the member's region differ from the nation as a whole. 
3 Fratantoni and Schuh (2003, p.7) describe the Fed's view of how to react to region-level events.  "This view is 
illustrated by a video game in the visitors' lobby at the Federal Reserve Board called 'You Are the Chairman,' which 
asks players to select a monetary policy—tighter, looser, or no change—in response to different scenarios.  Most 
scenarios focus on traditional policy responses to macroeconomic developments in real GDP, inflation, and interest 
rates.  But in one scenario, unemployment begins to rise in several farm-belt states.  Players are told the correct 
answer is no change." 
  1that the decreases in regional income following a contractionary monetary policy shock are 
larger in regions where manufacturing is relatively more important.
5  In Fratantoni and Schuh, 
monetary policy shocks are transmitted to the regional and aggregate economies through 
mortgage rates and the housing market.  They find that the aggregate impulse response to a 
monetary policy contraction exhibits nonlinearities because of aggregation over heterogeneous 
regions and state-dependence on initial regional incomes. 
  We bring the literature further in line with current monetary analyses by introducing a 
structural break into the estimation.  Although the preceding papers account for differences in the 
effects of monetary policy across regions, they do not allow for differences in the effects of 
monetary policy over time.  In large part, the period that these studies analyzed was too short to 
allow for such considerations.
6  Recently, though, a large literature has examined variation 
through the post-War era (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, 2000; and Boivin and Giannoni, 2002).  
These studies are aimed at finding persistent changes in policy which stem, for example, from 
changes in central bank leadership or transparency.  These changes can have a large effect on the 
volatility of money, interest rates, and output at the aggregate level.  For example, Clarida, Gali, 
and Gertler argue that a change in the inflation weight in the Fed's post-1982 Taylor rule has 
resulted in a more stable policy.  Boivin and Giannoni consider whether the Fed's effectiveness 
has evolved during the post-War period.  Thus far, however, no studies have considered whether 
the region-level effects of monetary policy have changed over time. 
                                                                                                                                                             
4 Carlino and DeFina (1999) survey this literature, as do Bias (1992) and Dow (1987). 
5 Mihov (2001) performs a similar exercise, but focuses on the comparison between differences in the U.S. and 
differences in the member countries of the European Monetary Union. 
6 Carlino and DeFina (1998, 1999) use data through 1992.  Fratantoni and Schuh (2003) use data through 1996. 
  2  We allow each region's response to a monetary shock to differ between the pre-Volcker 
and Volcker-Greenspan eras and address at the regional level two issues: the cost of disinflation 
and the timing and pattern of monetary-policy-induced recessions.  Further, we consider whether 
the regional differences in the effects of monetary policy are related to measures of various 
channels of monetary policy: the money channel, the broad credit channel, and the bank lending 
channel.    
  The paper proceeds as follows:  Section 2 reviews the structural VAR of monetary policy 
and presents the estimation of a benchmark aggregate VAR in three sample periods: the full 
sample, the pre-Volcker period, and the Volcker-Greenspan period.  Section 3 describes and 
estimates our regional VAR, and compares the timing, depth, and lengths of regional responses 
to a monetary tightening across the three sample periods.  In section 4, we examine the 
possibility that a monetary VAR that includes a regional dimension can partially address the so-
called duration puzzle.  In section 5, we use the results of our regional VAR to estimate the 
importance of different channels of monetary policy, and in section 6 we determine that the 
changes over time are due to changes in the monetary-policy-propagation mechanism.  Section 7 
concludes. 
 
2. Monetary VARs 
  Innovations to monetary policy can occur in two forms: changes in the implementation of 
policy and changes in the objectives of policy.  We focus on the former, which is typically 
modeled as vector innovations to a system of equations (e.g., a VAR) in which monetary policy 
has been identified by structural restrictions on either the contemporaneous impacts of the 
  3variables (e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 1999; and Bernanke and Mihov, 1998) or the 
long-run effects on the system of variables (e.g., Blanchard and Quah, 1989; and Shapiro and 
Watson, 1988).
  This structural VAR literature has identified a number of stylized facts about the 
effects of a contractionary monetary shock: a U-shaped output response, a permanent decrease in 
the price level, and a temporary rise in interest rates. 
  A structural economic system can be written as 
∑
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  We estimate two versions of the VAR: a benchmark VAR that uses aggregate data and 
another that uses regional data.  In the benchmark aggregate VAR,   includes the log CPI price 
level and the log level of real aggregate personal income (PI).  In the regional VAR, aggregate PI 




7 The exceptions are interest rates, which are expressed as percentages. 
8 The composition of the BEA regions is given in the Appendix. 
9 Although GDP, industrial production, and coincident indicators are the aggregate income variables of choice in the 
literature, we use PI because none of the aforementioned variables are available at the regional level on a quarterly 
basis.  To ensure that our results are not specific to our use of PI, we have also estimated our benchmark aggregate 
VAR with GDP data, finding very little difference in the shape and magnitude of the resulting impulse responses. 
  4  In both versions of the VAR,   contains both the 10-year Treasury rate and a commodity 
price index.
t z
10  Also, the only policy instrument in   is the federal funds rate (FFR).  This 
abstracts from Bernanke and Mihov (1998), who argue that the instrument changes from the 
federal funds rate to reserves during the so-called monetarist experiment period of 1979-82.  We 
control for energy prices by including  , which are exogenous oil dummies corresponding to 






  To provide a benchmark to compare to our regional VAR results, we construct a fairly 
standard aggregate VAR.  Rewrite (1) as a three-lag, reduced-form VAR: 
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  We estimate the preceding five-variable aggregate VAR with OLS equation-by-equation 
using quarterly data.  Our full-sample estimation uses data for 1960:I - 2002:IV, our pre-Volcker 
estimation uses data for 1960:I - 1978:IV, and our Volcker-Greenspan estimation uses data for 
1983:I - 2002:IV.  Unfortunately, because the so-called monetarist experiment period of 1979-
1982 offers too few observations, we cannot examine that subperiod separately.
12  Data are 
seasonally adjusted and are taken from the Federal Reserve Board (FFR, 10-year Treasury), the 
 
10 As in Bagliano and Favero (1998), the 10-year Treasury rate is included to separate the effects of monetary policy 
shocks from independent disturbances to long-term rates.  As in Sims (1986), commodity prices are included to 
mitigate the effects of the price puzzle. 
11 VARs sometimes include energy prices for this purpose.  Hamilton (2003), however, has argued that 
incorporating oil or energy price data directly into the regression is inappropriate.  Oil price shocks affect the 
economy asymmetrically:  A decrease or a small increase in the price of oil tends to have a small effect on the larger 
economy while larger increases—particularly those that are viewed to be permanent—can have large and persistent 
effects.  This asymmetry might lead to a mis-specification of the response of other variables. 
12 An alternative to excluding the monetarist experiment period altogether is to dummy out its effects.  Doing so 
provides qualitatively similar results to our full-sample estimation. 
  5Bureau of Economic Analysis (PI, CPI), and the FIBER industrial materials price index 
(commodity prices).  We employ a standard lower-block recursive identification of monetary 
policy with three blocks: the policy block and the non-policy variables that are and are not 
contemporaneously affected by monetary policy shock.
13   
  We should note that our estimation differs from Carlino and DeFina (1998, 1999) in that 
we consider the effects of a one-time shock to the federal funds rate, rather than the permanent 
shock that they considered.  In their estimation, because the shock to the federal funds rate is 
permanent, so is the monetary-policy-induced recession.  Because we consider a one-time shock, 
as is standard in the monetary economics literature, we can analyze the dynamics of recovery 
from a monetary-policy-induced recession.    
  Figure 1 illustrates the impulse responses—along with their 90-percent bootstrapped 
confidence bands—to a one-hundred-basis-point shock to the FFR.  In addition, Table 1 presents 
four key measures (in central tendency) of the effect on PI: the number of quarters after the 
shock that the region's PI reached its trough, the magnitude of the PI decrease at the trough, the 
number of quarters it took for the region's PI to recover its pre-shock level, and the total PI loss 
over the 20 quarters.  Qualitatively, the responses are roughly representative of the results found 
in the monetary VAR literature (for example, Boivin and Giannoni, 2003).   
  For the full sample, aggregate PI declines subsequent to the contractionary monetary 
shock, reaching its trough—a 0.25 percent decrease—in the seventh quarter.  PI begins reverting 
back to the initial level following a recessionary period, although it does not quite reach it within 
                                                 
13 We also assume that the policymaker does not react to long-term interest rates. 
  6the 20 quarters depicted.  Combining the depth and length of the recession, the total PI loss over 
the 20 quarters is just over 3 percent.  The CPI increases for a short period (the price-puzzle 
effect) but, after two years, is lower than in the initial period.  Similarly, the contractionary shock 
to the funds rate is reversed after about ten quarters, while the 10-year Treasury rate and the 
commodity price index return to their initial levels after three and five years, respectively. 
  The results for the two split samples reveal that the full-sample results mask significant 
changes over time in the effects of monetary policy.  Most importantly, a monetary shock 
induces a deeper and more-persistent recession during the pre-Volcker period than during the 
Volcker-Greenspan period.  In the earlier period, PI at the trough is about 0.6 percent lower than 
its initial level, while in the later period it is only about 0.1 percent lower.  The trough of the 
Volcker-Greenspan period occurs three quarters later than in the pre-Volcker period, although 
recovery does not occur by the 20th quarter for either period.  The starkness of the differences 
between the samples is highlighted by the result that a FFR shock in the pre-Volcker period 
results in a total PI loss after 20 quarters that is almost 10 times as high as in the Volcker-
Greenspan period, and more than three times as high as indicated by the full sample. 
  There also appears to be an inflation-expectations response during the Volcker-
Greenspan period: PI rises in the first year following the shock while the 10-year bond rate 
remains at or near its initial level.  Note also that, for the Volcker-Greenspan period, PI is not 
statistically different from the initial level for any quarter following the shock.  Another 
important difference across the three samples is in the response of the CPI.  Whereas there is 
significant CPI deflation over the 20 quarters in the full sample, the shock in the pre-Volcker 
  7period yields a long price-puzzle effect, whereas there is little-to-no CPI response in the Volcker-
Greenspan period.  This is consistent with Hanson (2004). 
 
3. A Regional Monetary VAR 
  Our intent is to investigate the nature of the responses of real regional PI levels to a 
monetary policy shock.  To do this, we modify the aggregate VAR above to account for regional 
differences.  Thus, in the non-policy block xt we replace aggregate PI with its eight regional 
counterparts. 
  In addition to the standard assumptions about the contemporaneous effect of policy, we 
make assumptions regarding the propagation of regional income shocks.  As in Carlino and 
DeFina (1998, 1999) and Fratantoni and Schuh (2003), we assume that the idiosyncratic regional 
income shock does not affect other regions contemporaneously, although it is allowed to affect 
other regions in subsequent quarters.
14   
  Figure 2 provides the impulse responses to a one-time, one-hundred-basis-point shock to 
the FFR in this 12-variable VAR using the three samples.
15  For each of the three samples, the 
impulse responses from the regional VAR are qualitatively similar to their respective 
counterparts from the aggregate VAR illustrated by Figure 1.  More interesting, though, are the 
large cross-regional differences within each sample,
 and the large cross-sample differences for 
individual regions. 
                                                 
14 While these assumptions will aid us in comparing the relative effects of the monetary shock against other shocks, 
we need not specify the propagation mechanism for the regional income shocks to identify the monetary shock 
alone.  In principle, we could restrict our attention to the monetary shock and achieve identification without 
restrictions on contemporaneous cross-regional impacts in the matrix ax. 
15 Presented along with the impulse responses are 90-percent bootstrapped confidence intervals. 
  83.1 Full-Sample Results 
  The cross-regional differences in the impulse responses using the full sample are 
illustrated by Figure 2, and the measures of the magnitudes of the regional monetary-policy-
induced recessions are summarized in Table 2.  All regions reach their trough in the sixth or 
seventh quarter, roughly in line with the aggregate economy.  The regional differences in the 
magnitudes of the income losses at the troughs are prominent, though, and vary a good deal 
around the 0.25 percent PI loss indicated by the aggregate VAR.  The Great Lakes has, by far, 
the deepest trough, seeing a 0.31 percent lower PI, while, at the other end, the Mideast, 
Southwest, and New England regions have the shallowest troughs of 0.131, 0.139, and 0.141 
percent reductions in PI, respectively.   
  Recovery from the recession occurs at very different times across the regions.  Whereas 
the aggregate VAR indicates that the aggregate economy does not return to its initial PI by the 
20th quarter, our regional VAR indicates that recovery occurs in the 18th quarter or earlier in 
five regions.  In contrast, the Southwest, Rocky Mountain, and Far West regions are still in 
recession after the 20th quarter.   
  As is clear from our results, there are large regional differences in both the depths and 
lengths of monetary-policy-induced recessions.  The final column of Table 2 takes into account 
both the depth and length, providing calculations of the total losses to regional PI over 20 
quarters.  The Great Lakes region has the largest total PI loss.  At the opposite end, three 
regions—New England, the Plains, and the Mideast—had total PI losses much smaller that of the 
Great Lakes.  For the Mideast and New England, this is because their monetary-policy-induced 
  9recessions are both shallow and brief, while for the Plains it is because its rather deep recession 
is followed by a rapid recovery. 
  For the full sample, our regional results bear some resemblance to those of Carlino and 
DeFina (1998).  But because their monetary policy shock is a permanent increase in the FFR—
thereby inducing a permanent change in the growth rate of PI—the two sets of results are not 
entirely comparable.  In particular, because recovery never occurs following their monetary 
shock, they cannot compare regions on the basis of the length of time it takes to recover from the 
monetary-policy-induced recession. 
3.2. Pre-Volcker Period 
  As is clear from Table 2 and Figure 2, the results using only the pre-Volcker sample 
indicate much deeper and more costly regional recessions following a monetary policy tightening 
than do the results using the full sample.  This is consistent with the differences between the two 
samples in the aggregate VAR.  In addition, though, the two samples provide different results 
about the regional effects of the monetary policy shock.  All regions see deeper troughs and all 
but the Rocky Mountain region see higher total PI losses.  As in the full sample, the Great Lakes 
has the deepest trough.  The difference between the Great Lakes and other regions in this regard, 
however, is not as large as the full-sample results suggest:  The Plains and the Southeast have 
troughs that are nearly as deep as the Great Lakes.  Also, in contrast with the full-sample results, 
the shallowest troughs are in the Rocky Mountain, Far West, and Southwest regions, rather than 
in the Mideast, New England, and the Southwest. 
  10  The recession lengths are also affected by the splitting of the sample.  Four regions see 
recovery arriving at least two quarters earlier than in the full sample, while two see recovery 
arriving at least two quarters later.  Also, compared with the full sample, the pre-Volcker sub-
sample suggests somewhat smaller relative differences in the total PI losses of a monetary-
policy-induced recession.  Only the Rocky Mountain region stands out as having much lower 
total PI losses than the other regions.   
3.3. Volcker-Greenspan Period 
  As with the aggregate VAR, monetary policy shocks have much smaller recessionary 
effects during the Volcker-Greenspan period than in the pre-Volcker period or the full sample.  
In addition, estimates for the Volcker-Greenspan period yield quite different comparisons among 
the regions in the timing, depth, and costs of monetary-policy-induced recessions.  For four 
regions—Plains, Southwest, Rocky Mountain, and Far West—the recession is extremely shallow 
to the extent that the trough is an order of magnitude smaller than in either of the other two 
samples.  The other five regions, on the other hand, have troughs that are in line with those from 
the full sample.  The Great Lakes, though, is the only region whose PI level is below its initial 
level to a statistically significant extent for at least one quarter. 
  This sub-sample's results highlight also the varying lengths of regional recessions.  The 
recovery quarters tend to come much earlier than in the other samples, and the ranking across the 
regions differs a great deal.  In particular, note that the earliest recoveries occur for the Mideast, 
Southwest, Rocky Mountain, and Far West regions.  In contrast, the full-sample results indicate 
that the last three of these do not see recovery until beyond the 20 quarters that we examine.   
  11  The differences between the Volcker-Greenspan sample and the other two samples are 
illustrated most clearly by the differences in the region's total PI loss following a monetary 
policy shock.  Because of shallower recessions, quick recovery, and the inflation-expectations 
response, the total PI losses are much smaller, and five regions actually see total PI gains over 
the period. 
 
4. Duration Puzzle 
  Recall that, for all three sample periods, our aggregate VAR indicates that personal 
income does not return to its original level even five years after a monetary policy shock.  This 
“duration puzzle” is the norm in the literature, which tends to find implausibly long monetary-
policy-induced recessions (e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 1999; Bernanke and Mihov, 
1998; Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, 2000; and Hanson, 2004).  In contrast, for all three sample 
periods, our regional VAR indicates that a majority of regions see their personal incomes return 
to their initial level well before what is suggested by our aggregate VAR.  In fact, for the 
Volcker-Greenspan period, the regional VAR indicates that all regions have recovered by the 
13th quarter, whereas the aggregate VAR indicates that recovery does not occur even by the 20th 
quarter.   
  One explanation for the duration puzzle might, therefore, be that aggregate VARs suffer 
from aggregation bias because of nonlinearities in the relationship between the FFR and PI.  This 
is consistent with Lütkepohl (1984), who demonstrates how the persistence of an aggregate 
series reflects the most persistent of the disaggregated series.  Figure 3 compares the impulse 
response from the aggregate VAR (from Table 1 and Figure 1) to the weighted sum of the 
  12regional PI responses from Figure 2.  Key aggregate measures of the monetary-policy-induced 
recession from the regional VAR are included in Table 2.   
  In the full and pre-Volcker samples, the regional VAR suggests a shallower and shorter 
recession than does the aggregate VAR.  This difference is especially stark for the pre-Volcker 
sample, in which the regional VAR suggests a trough of 0.375 rather than the trough of 0.595 
suggested by the aggregate VAR.  Also for this period, the regional VAR suggests that the 
recession ends by the sixteenth quarter and has a total PI loss of less than 4 percent.  For the 
aggregate VAR, however, after 20 quarters PI growth is barely above its trough and total PI is 9 
percent lower.   
  The impulse responses of aggregate PI from the aggregate VAR and the regional VAR 
also differ for the Volcker-Greenspan period.  The aggregate VAR indicates that, following a 
monetary policy shock, aggregate PI growth will remain negative for at least 20 quarters and 
result in a total PI loss of 0.971 percent.  In contrast, the regional VAR indicates that aggregate 
PI will suffer a short recession that reaches its trough quickly, ends by the 11th quarter, and 
results in a total PI loss of only 0.098 percent.  Thus, the sum of the disaggregated responses 
from the regional VAR revert back to trend more rapidly than the aggregate response produced 
by the aggregate VAR. 
 
5. Channels of Monetary Policy 
  The finding that a monetary shock has very different effects across regions is interesting 
on its own, but perhaps of more interest to monetary economists is that these findings might 
allow greater insight into the transmission of monetary shocks.  As in Carlino and DeFina (1998, 
  131999), multiple observations of the effects of monetary-policy shocks can be used to estimate the 
role of a list of monetary-transmission mechanisms.  Our eight regional impulse responses, 
however, are inadequate for the job and more disaggregation is necessary.  We need not restrict 
our analysis to the eight BEA regions, and, depending on data and tractability restrictions, it is 
possible to disaggregate further to obtain sub-regional impulse responses. 
  Because quarterly PI data are available at the state level, it is, in principle, possible to 
estimate 50 different responses to a monetary shock.  Unfortunately, though, the estimation of a 
54-variable model with our identification is intractable.
16  As an alternative, we divided the eight 
BEA regions into 20 sub-regions, each with between two and four states from the same BEA 
region.  The criteria for splitting the regions into sub-regions were contiguity and business cycle 
similarity, as measured by the simple correlation of states' quarterly PI growth rates.
17  We 
eliminated the Detached Far West sub region, whose two members are Alaska and Hawaii.  With 
19 sub-regions, we have enough observations to estimate the roles of different monetary 
channels, while still requiring only one VAR and a single contemporaneous impact matrix.   
  Table 3 presents the results of the sub-regional VAR for the full sample and the Volcker-
Greenspan period.  The effects of the monetary-policy-induced recession are summarized by the 
PI loss at the trough and the total PI loss over 20 quarters.  For the most part, the results echo 
those for the regional VAR.  The most notable new result is the large difference for both samples 
                                                 
16 Note that Carlino and DeFina (1998, 1999) obtain impulse responses for each of the 50 states by estimating 50 
different VARs, each with nine regions.  For state i's VAR, the nine regions are: state i, state i's BEA region 
excluding state i, and the other seven BEA regions.  Because the definition of regions differs across VARs, each 
VAR has its own contemporaneous impact matrix. 
17 The list of sub-regions and their states is provided in the appendix along with the correlations of quarterly PI 
growth rates within BEA regions. 
  14between the East Great Lakes and West Great Lakes sub-regions.  For our purposes, though, 
these 19 impulse responses allow us to test various channels of monetary policy. 
  Textbook explanations of the impact of monetary policy typically show that a monetary 
contraction reduces the demand for capital and durables, thereby reducing aggregate demand.  
Cecchetti (1995) has termed this the money channel.  Because manufacturing industries 
(particularly capital- and durable-goods industries) are the most sensitive to interest rates, the 
importance of the money channel would be indicated by a positive relationship between the loss 
of PI following a monetary policy shock and the size of the manufacturing sector.  To proxy for 
the interest sensitivity of the region's industrial mix, we use the sub-regions' shares of total non-
farm employment in the manufacturing sector.
18
  If the differences between sub-regions in the effects of monetary policy are due to 
differences in the ability of their banking sectors to provide loans, then monetary policy can be 
said to work through credit channels (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994).  Small firms are thought to 
have higher information and transaction costs when dealing with banks, thereby making it more 
costly for them to obtain financing (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Bernanke, 1993).  To proxy for 
this broad credit channel, we use two separate measures: the share of total employment that is in 
firms with fewer than 100 employees, and the average number of employees per firm.
19  If the 
broad credit channel is important, regions with a high share of small firms should see larger PI 
losses following a monetary tightening; as would regions with a low average firm size. 
                                                 
18 These data are from the BLS and are available at the state level for 1969-2001.  For the full sample period, we 
used the yearly manufacturing share averaged over 1969-2001.  For the Volcker-Greenspan period, we used the 
same measure averaged over 1983-2001. 
19 These data are from the Statistics of U.S. Business data set produced by the Census Bureau.  Because the data are 
available starting in 1988, we use the same measures for the full sample and the Volcker-Greenspan period. 
  15  In addition to the broad credit channel, empirical studies have identified a bank lending 
or narrow credit channel:  Small banks are more limited than large banks in their ability to find 
alternative funding sources when monetary policy is tight and are, therefore, less able to make 
loans (Kashyap and Stein, 1995, 2000).  If the bank lending channel is important, regions in 
which large banks are relatively more important should experience smaller decreases in PI 
following a tightening of monetary policy.  To proxy for the bank lending channel we use the 
average deposit share of the largest three and the largest five banks.
20
  Summary statistics for all the variables are presented in Table 4.  The results of our OLS 
estimation using recession costs for the full-sample results and the Volcker-Greenspan results are 
presented in Tables 5 and 6, respectively.  Unfortunately, there are insufficient data to perform 
this exercise for the pre-Volcker period.  Thus, we are comparing estimates obtained using the 
methodology in the existing literature—which considered the full sample only—with estimates 
obtained using our methodology—which allows for a structural break.  For each of the two 
periods, we estimated the effects of the channels of monetary policy on the PI loss at the trough 
and on the total PI loss.  By alternating the two measures for each of the broad credit channel and 
the bank lending channel, we used four combinations of independent variables for each 
dependent variable.   
  For the impulse responses obtained using the full sample, there is no evidence that any of 
the channels are important for explaining the depth of the trough of a recession.  None of the 
estimated coefficients on the monetary-channel variables are statistically different from zero, and 
                                                 
20 For each region, we use the weighted average of the state deposit shares.  These data are State and Metropolitan 
Area Data Book (1986, 1991) produced by the Census Bureau.  Because the earliest data are for 1983, we use the 
same measures for the full sample and the Volcker-Greenspan period. 
  16the empirical specifications have little explanatory power.  There is abundant evidence, however, 
that all three channels are important for explaining the total costs of a monetary-policy-induced 
recession, as the estimated coefficients are typically statistically different from zero.  Although 
the signs are as expected for the money channel and the broad credit channel, the results are not 
as expected for the bank lending channel.  They suggest that monetary-policy-induced recessions 
tend to be more costly in regions where large banks have higher shares of deposits. 
  Recall, though, that the costs of a monetary-policy-induced recession differ a great deal 
according to whether the VAR uses data for the Volcker-Greenspan period or the full sample.  
Correspondingly, the conclusions about the importance of the various channels of monetary 
policy also depend on the sample period used to generate the regional impulse responses.  In fact, 
the distinction is crucial to the results regarding the importance of the three channels.   
  As summarized by Table 6, for the Volcker-Greenspan period, only the bank lending 
channel is important in determining the depths of monetary-policy-induced recessions, and in the 
expected way:  Regions in which large banks are more important tend to have shallower 
recessions.  Recall that the full-sample results did not provide evidence that any of the channels 
were important in determining the depths of the recessions.  On the other hand, the results for the 
Volcker-Greenspan period suggest that only the money channel is important for determining the 
total PI costs of the recessions:  Monetary-policy-induced recessions tend to be more costly for 
sub-regions with large manufacturing sectors.  
  Our results are in contrast with Carlino and DeFina (1998, 1999), who find that all three 
channels have some role in explaining regional difference in the effects of monetary policy, 
although the effect of the bank lending channel is opposite of what is expected.  Recall, though, 
  17that because they look at the effects of a permanent tightening of monetary policy, their 
estimation does not provide separate results for the depth and total costs of recessions.  
According to our results, however, this distinction is important.  
 
6. Counterfactuals 
  We have identified marked variation in the reaction of personal income across regions, 
and have attributed some of the regional differences to local attributes.  We have shown also that 
every region of the United States has been decidedly less responsive to monetary policy during 
the Volcker-Greenspan era than during the pre-Volcker era.  In this section, we conduct a series 
of counterfactual experiments to determine whether changes in volatility and responsiveness 
across time can be attributed either to changes in the contemporaneous impact of monetary 
policy or to the propagation mechanism.  To do so, we create a counterfactual for each period by 
combining its contemporaneous impact matrix with the other period’s propagation mechanism.  
We then compare the resulting impulse responses to a 100-basis-point shock to the true one for 
the period.   
  Figure 4 illustrates the results of these experiments, which demonstrate that, for every 
region and each subperiod, you can obtain something very close to the other period’s impulse 
response function by swapping propagation mechanisms.  We conclude, then, that the cross-
period differences in the true impulse response functions depend more on the nature of the 
transmission mechanism than on the contemporaneous impacts of the shocks.   
 
  187. Conclusions 
  As with the previous literature, we have shown that there are large regional differences in 
the effects of monetary policy shocks.  The primary contribution of our analysis is to show that 
the choice of sample period matters a great deal in estimating the depths, lengths, and total costs 
of regional monetary-policy-induced recessions.  Moreover, the ranking of the regions in terms 
of these recession measures is also sensitive to the sample period.  For the Volcker-Greenspan 
period, recessions are deepest in New England and the Great Lakes region, and end the earliest in 
the Southwest and Far West.  Over 20 quarters, the total costs of the monetary policy shock is 
positive only for three regions: the Southeast, Great Lakes, and New England.  Our regional 
VAR also suggests that an aggregate VAR suffers from aggregation bias, suggestion a partial 
solution to the duration puzzle.  Specifically, the aggregate of our regional impulse responses 
indicates a shorter monetary-policy-induced recession and lower total PI losses than does our 
aggregate VAR. 
  To test for the importance of various channels of monetary policy, we also estimate a 
sub-regional VAR.  As with the regional VAR, the period examined matters.  For the Volcker-
Greenspan period, we find evidence that the depth of recession is related to the bank lending 
channel, and that the total cost of recession is related to the money channel.  Finally, we perform 
counterfactual experiments to determine that the changes in the regional effects of monetary 
policy over time are due to changes in the monetary-policy-propagation mechanism, rather than 
to change in the contemporaneous effects of a monetary-policy shock.
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Appendix: Allocation of States to Regions 









Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont 




New Jersey, New York 
Delaware, Dist. of Columbia, Maryland, Pennsylvania 
 
Great Lakes  East 
West 















Alabama, Kentucky, Tennessee 
Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina 
Virginia, West Virginia 






Arizona, New Mexico 
 
Rocky Mountain  North 
South 
Idaho, Montana, Wyoming 
Colorado, Utah 
 







The division of BEA regions into sub-regions is as determined by the authors. 
  20Appendix: Simple Correlations of Quarterly Growth in Personal Income within BEA Regions (1960.I – 2003.III) 
Shaded areas indicate subregions listed in table
 
New England 
ME NH VT CT MA RI
ME  1.00                
NH  0.84  1.00          
VT  0.68  0.81  1.00      
CT 0.73  0.63  0.49  1.00       
MA 0.71 0.68 0.63 0.72  1.00    
RI 0.71  0.75  0.68  0.62  0.69  1.00 
 
Mideast 
NJ NY DC DE MD PA
NJ  1.00          
NY  0.55  1.00      
DC 0.82  0.60  1.00          
DE 0.83  0.56  0.71  1.00       
MD 0.74 0.51 0.56  0.74  1.00    
PA 0.34  0.30  0.40  0.32  0.27  1.00 
 
Great Lakes 
IN MI OH IL WI
IN  1.00           
MI  0.66  1.00        
OH  0.74  0.62  1.00    
IL 0.45  0.21  0.34  1.00    
WI 0.67  0.46  0.61  0.58  1.00 
 
Plains 
IA MN NE ND SD KS MO
IA  1.00          
MN  0.66  1.00      
NE 0.74  0.74  1.00         
ND 0.74  0.57  0.75  1.00      
SD 0.71  0.58  0.71  0.74  1.00  
KS  0.77 0.73 0.74 0.75 0.73 1.00 





AL KY TN FL GA NC SC VA WV AR LA MS
AL 1.00  
KY 0.41 1.00  
TN 0.67 0.43 1.00  
FL 0.82 0.43 0.58 1.00   
GA 0.68 0.35 0.44 0.68 1.00    
NC 0.73 0.41 0.50 0.73 0.81  1.00
SC 0.51 0.32 0.23 0.40 0.48  0.55 1.00
VA 0.66 0.30 0.53 0.57 0.48 0.51 0.47 1.00
WV 0.70 0.34 0.63 0.62 0.42 0.50 0.38 0.60 1.00
AR 0.66 0.35 0.48 0.69 0.67 0.66 0.39 0.58 0.46 1.00
LA 0.73 0.41 0.44 0.74 0.65 0.65 0.40 0.45 0.45 0.59 1.00
MS 0.63 0.36 0.44 0.68 0.58 0.58 0.36 0.49 0.49 0.51 0.75 1.00
 
Southwest 
OK TX AZ NM
OK 1.00
TX 0.62 1.00
AZ 0.47 0.60 1.00
NM 0.67 0.73 0.74 1.00
 
Rocky Mountain 
ID MT WY CO UT
ID 1.00
MT 0.32 1.00
WY 0.39 0.59 1.00
CO 0.38 0.58 0.51 1.00
UT 0.44 0.67 0.73 0.60 1.00 
 
Far West 
OR WA CA NV AK HI
OR 1.00  
WA 0.25 1.00  
CA 0.21 0.41 1.00  
NV 0.09 0.37 0.53 1.00  
AK 0.15 0.40 0.61 0.53 1.00    
HI 0.22 0.48 0.67 0.52 0.65  1.00
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Table 1. Monetary-Policy-Induced Recessions: Aggregate VAR 
 







1960 - 2002 
7  0.250 >20 3.074 
Pre-Volcker 
1960 - 1978 
8  0.595 >20 9.355 
Volcker-Greenspan 
1983 - 2002 
11  0.115 >20 0.971 
Full Sample: 1960:I - 2002:IV; Pre-Volcker: 1960:I - 1978:IV; Volcker-Greenspan: 1983:I - 
2002:IV.  For the Volcker-Greenspan period, the trough is the quarter with the largest PI loss 
following the initial expectations-adjustment interval.  The recovery quarter is the first quarter 
of positive PI growth after the trough. 
 
 
  24Table 2. Monetary-Policy-Induced Recessions: Regional VAR 
 




Total PI Loss 
(Gain) 
  New England  7  0.141  17  1.264 
 Mideast  6  0.131  16  1.091 
 Great  Lakes  7  0.311  18  3.014 
 Plains  6  0.233  16  1.591 
Full Sample  Southeast  6  0.215  18  1.960 
1960-2002  Southwest  7  0.139 >20 2.248 
  Rocky  Mountain  6  0.202 >20 2.531 
  Far  West  7  0.218 >20 2.568 
 Aggregate  of 
Regions 
6 0.170  18  1.630 
  New England  6  0.433  18  4.347 
  Mideast  5  0.366 >20 4.001 
 Great  Lakes  5  0.590  15  4.803 
 Plains  7  0.501  14  3.019 
Pre-Volcker  Southeast  7  0.467 >20 4.684 
1960-1978  Southwest  8  0.350 >20 4.310 
 Rocky  Mountain  7  0.278  13  1.568 
 Far  West  7  0.350  16  3.079 
 Aggregate  of 
Regions 
7 0.375  16  3.662 
  New England  7  0.221  12   0.237 
 Mideast  6  0.132  11  (0.055) 
  Great Lakes  6  0.215  12   0.476 
Plains 8  0.078  13  (0.149) 
Southeast 8  0.150  13    0.485  Volcker-
Greenspan 
1983-2002 
Southwest 7  0.017  8  (0.751) 
 Rocky  Mountain  7  0.061  11  (0.735) 
 Far  West  7  0.014  8  (0.877) 
 Aggregate  of 
Regions 
7  0.110  11    0.098 
Full Sample: 1960:I - 2002:IV; Pre-Volcker: 1960:I - 1978:IV; Volcker-Greenspan: 1983:I - 2002:IV.  For 
the Volcker-Greenspan period, the trough is the quarter with the largest PI loss following the expectations-
adjustment interval.  The recovery quarter is the first quarter of positive PI growth after the trough. 
 
 
  25  Table 3. Monetary-Policy-Induced Recessions: Sub-Regional VAR 
 
 Full  Sample  Volcker-Greenspan 








North New England  0.177  2.659  0.088  (0.008) 
South New England  0.160  2.777  0.076  (0.172) 
North Mideast  0.149  2.295  0.086  (0.251) 
South Mideast  0.144  1.894  0.081  (0.142) 
East Great Lakes  0.304  2.702  0.113  0.565 
West Great Lakes  0.198  2.039  0.125  0.167 
Northeast Plains  0.286  1.254  0.367  (0.263) 
Northwest Plains  0.238  2.243  0.159  (0.200) 
South Plains  0.233  2.129  0.125  0.142 
Central Southeast  0.244 2.368 0.114 0.436 
East Southeast  0.219  3.177  0.132  0.688 
North Southeast  0.179  2.314  0.097  (0.156) 
West Southeast  0.225  1.774  0.136  0.345 
East Southwest  0.186  2.008  0.253  (0.832) 
West Southwest  0.244  3.131  0.114  0.605 
North Rocky Mountain 0.176  1.026  0.105  (0.868) 
South Rocky Mountain 0.174  2.143  0.135  (0.723) 
North Far West  0.192  2.384  0.167  (0.037) 
South Far West  0.195  2.752  0.113  (1.019) 
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Table 4. Summary Statistics: Characteristics of Sub-Regions 
 











Personal income loss at trough  0.21 0.04 0.14 0.07 
Total personal income loss (gain)  2.27 0.55 -0.09 0.51 
Manufacturing share of non-farm employment 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics; full sample: 1969-2001; 
Volcker-Greenspan: 1983-2001) 
14.60 3.90 12.95 3.12 
Average employment share of firms with < 100 
employees (Statistics of U.S. Business, Census 
Bureau)
a
17.64 2.34 17.64 2.34 
Average firm size (Statistics of U.S. Business, 
Census Bureau, 1988-2001)
a
40.72 4.44 40.72 4.44 
Weighted average of state deposit shares of three 
largest banks (average of 1983 and 1989; State and 
Metropolitan Area Data Book, Census Bureau)
a
43.58 12.70 43.58 12.70 
Weighted average of state deposit shares of five 
largest banks (average of 1983 and 1989; State and 
Metropolitan Area Data Book, Census Bureau)
a
56.01 15.00 56.01 15.00 
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Table 5. The Channels of Monetary Policy, Full Sample 
 
  PI Loss at Trough  Total PI Loss 
 



















































   0.1272* 
(0.0488) 
   0.1194* 
(0.0546) 











Share of 3 largest 
banks 








Observations 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
F(3,15)  0.71 1.18 0.27 0.71 17.49  12.88  20.20  12.34 
R
2 0.121 0.109 0.061 0.060 0.782 0.730 0.796 0.702 
Root  MSE  0.045 0.045 0.047 0.047 0.284 0.316 0.275 0.332 
 
White-corrected standard errors are in parentheses.  An '*' indicates statistical significance at the 10-percent level. 
 
  28Table 6. The Channels of Monetary Policy, Volcker-Greenspan Era 
 
  PI Loss at Trough  Total PI Loss 
 
Constant  0.2036 
(0.2161) 
































































Share of 3 largest 
banks 








Observations 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
F(3,15)  1.20 1.15 0.92 0.88 4.41 4.76 4.75 5.08 
R
2 0.343 0.324 0.288 0.262 0.327 0.360 0.341 0.339 
Root  MSE  0.061 0.062 0.063 0.065 0.455 0.456 0.450 0.451   
 
White-corrected standard errors are in parentheses.  An '*' indicates statistical significance at the 10-percent level. 
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Figure 1. Aggregate VAR, Impulse Responses to Fed Funds Shock
 (percentage difference from initial level)
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Figure 1. Aggregate VAR, Impulse Responses to Fed Funds Shock
 (continued)
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Figure 2. Regional VAR, Impulse Responses to Fed Funds Shock
 (percentage difference from initial level)
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Figure 2. Regional VAR, Impulse Responses to Fed Funds Shock
 (continued)
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Figure 2. Regional VAR, Impulse Responses to Fed Funds Shock
 (continued)
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Figure 2. Regional VAR, Impulse Responses to Fed Funds Shock
 (percentage difference from initial level)
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